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ABSTRACT

The acquisition of relational concepts plays an integral role and is assumed to be a
prerequisite for analogical reasoning. Language and token-trained apes (e.g. Premack,
1976; Thompson, Oden, and Boysen, 1997) are the only nonhuman animals to succeed in
solving and completing analogies, thus implicating language as the mechanism enabling
the phenomenon. In the present study, I examine the role of meaning in the analogical
reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans, chimpanzees, and rhesus
monkeys completed relational match-to-sample (RMTS) tasks with either meaningful or
nonmeaningful stimuli. For human participants, meaningfulness facilitated the acquisition
of analogical rules. Individual differences were evident amongst the chimpanzees
suggesting that meaning can either enable or hinder their ability to complete analogies.
Rhesus monkeys did not succeed in either condition, suggesting that their ability to
reason analogically, if present at all, may be dependent upon a dimension other than the
representational value of stimuli.
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Introduction
Conceptual thinking affords us the opportunity to make sense of and to organize
our environment in such a way that it is more meaningful and far more manageable. We
are predisposed to organize our field of view into meaningful groups and search for
similarities among them, thus enabling them to be useful in our everyday lives. Of
interest to comparative psychologists is the degree to which our nonhuman primate
relatives posses similar capabilities and find such capabilities helpful in their everyday
lives. The range of conceptual abilities has been extensively investigated for several
species of the animal kingdom, including birds (Pepperberg, 1987; Cook, Wright, &
Kendrick, 1990; Wasserman, Young, & Fagot, 2001; Wright, Rivera, & Katz, 2003),
dolphins (Herman, Hovancik, Gory, & Bradshaw, 1989), monkeys (Bovet & Vauclair,
2001; Flemming, Beran, & Washburn, 2005; Katz, Wright, & Bachevalier, 2002; Shields,
Smith, & Washburn, 1997), and apes (Premack, 1976; Thompson & Oden, 1996). But,
how far are nonhuman animals able to abstract these conceptual abilities in order to apply
them to novel situations? One reason that such a question is intriguing is that the lower
levels of conceptual abilities observed in several nonhuman species afford us the unique
opportunity to examine the continuity of these cognitive processes across humans and
other animals (Herrnstein, 1990).
A concept is a set of characteristics shared by all those and only those instances in
a particular set (Engelmann, 1969). Concepts provide a means to solve new problems in
novel situations. Without the ability to think in terms of concepts, we might be
overwhelmed by the complexity of our environments (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin,
1956). Rather than searching for differences between objects that we encounter, concepts
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serve as instruments for simplifying our surroundings by determining how things are
alike (Herrnstein, 1990; Pearce, 1994; Zentall, Galizio, & Critchfield, 2002). Numerous
species including pigeons, monkeys, and humans show an affinity toward identity; these
species show a great deal of proficiency at matching same, but not different displays
(Fagot, Wasserman, & Young, 2001; Wasserman, Frank, & Young, 2002 Young and
Wasserman, 2002).
Conceptual abilities, like many other cognitive processes, lie on a continuum from
basic and perceptual to more abstract and even relational. Thomas (1980) proposed a
hierarchy of learning-intelligence that includes several levels of conceptual ability.
Levels 1-5 of Thomas’s learning-intelligence hierarchy outline basic habituation, signal
conditioning (Pavlovian conditioning), stimulus-response (operant) learning, chaining
(chaining stimulus-response learning units), and concurrent discrimination learning,
respectively. Level 6 concerns class concepts, the most basic level of conceptual
representation (Steirn & Thomas, 1990). At this level, objects can be processed together
because of their perceptual similarities with one another. In addition, more abstract
mental representations for classes of objects can be created and applied to arrays of
objects in order to group them together. For example, writing instruments such as pencils
and computer keyboards may share no physical similarities with one another, but can
nonetheless be grouped together because they afford the same functionality to the user.
These concepts can be applied further to relational concepts, also referred to as
abstract relations (Herrnstein, 1990; Thompson & Oden, 1996) as described in levels 7
and 8 of Thomas’s (1980) learning-intelligence hierarchy. At these levels, classification
deals not with the exemplars themselves, but with the relations between and among
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concepts (i.e., sameness and difference). Rather than attending to discrete physical
qualities, we can examine the relatedness of one object to another and decide how they
are related (Premack, 1976; Thompson, 1995). Perhaps the highest order of conceptually
mediated behavior is the ability to judge relations-between-relations that forms the
necessary foundation for analogical reasoning, which many regard as the hallmark of
human reasoning and intelligence (Gentner & Markman, 1997; Holyoak & Thagard,
1997; Premack, 1983; Sternberg, 1977).
Studying Concepts in Nonhuman Animals
Certainly for nonhuman animals, conveying functional definitions of concepts
cannot be accomplished through verbal communication. Rather, we must rely on
nonverbal conceptually mediated behavior. Just as we teach concepts to children who
understand spoken language, we require an analog for studying such conceptual abilities
in nonhuman animals. One way to demonstrate the understanding of a concept is through
nonlingual overt behaviors. Conceptually mediated behavior is both functionally adaptive
and cognitively efficient in ways that it permits animals to judge and to adjust their
behavior to novel objects and events by virtue of membership in an already familiar class
(Cook et al., 1990; Herrnstein, 1990; Premack, 1983; Wasserman, et al., 2002. By
making these explicit similarity judgments both between and within common classes of
objects, animals can convey understanding of conceptual information without the use of
spoken language. The animal’s behavior can thus be said to reflect their conceptual
understanding (Pearce, 1994). This said, it is difficult for us to know precisely how
animals would define their concepts, but certainly not impossible.
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Roberts and Mazmanian (1988) investigated concept acquisition at varying levels
of abstraction in three different species: humans, pigeons, and squirrel monkeys. Utilizing
concepts at three levels of abstraction similar to those described above (Thomas, 1980),
Roberts and Mazmanian employed a two-choice discrimination task that required animals
to differentiate one slide from another. Slides were presented two at a time to the animals.
Animals pressed a key corresponding to one of the slide choices on any given trial. If a
slide was deemed to be “in-category” selection of it was rewarded with either a light
(humans), a banana pellet (monkeys), or the brief presentation of a grain hopper
(pigeons). If the chosen slide was not “in-category” no reward was dispensed. Slides
were photographs of animals from an assortment of books and magazines. Slides with
animals contained a wide variety of species including insects, fish, birds, amphibians,
reptiles, and mammals. A disproportionately larger number of pictures came from the
bird class, as the basic level discrimination was that of the common kingfisher (Alcedo
atthis) from other birds. All pictures varied in the viewpoint from which the photograph
was taken, as well as coloring, number of animals in the picture, and proportion of animal
to background area. The pictures not containing animals included a variety of indoor and
outdoor scenes with trees, flowers, mountains, foods, clothing, airplanes, and houses.
After 30 sessions of training with one set of slides, eight days of transfer testing with
probe stimuli were conducted.
Humans, not surprisingly, were able to acquire concepts at the basic, lowabstraction, as well as the high-abstraction levels. Humans correctly chose the “incategory” slides with around 90% accuracy for all three levels. Monkeys and pigeons,
however, were less successful at certain levels of abstraction. Monkeys were significantly
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better at making the discriminations at low (kingfisher vs. other bird) and high (animal
vs. nonanimal) levels. Pigeons only successfully acquired the most basic concept: they
discriminated only kingfishers from nonkingfishers. All three species appeared to have
formed the kingfisher concept. When the problem was made more abstract by requiring
subjects to identify birds in general, or animals in general, the category may have become
too broad or abstract for the subjects to learn a simple rule for identification for
identifying individual exemplars (Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988). These findings support
the theory that animals learn concepts by responding to a small set of features in pictures
that look similar (Premack, 1983; Zentall et al., 2002).
When studying concept formation and acquisition in our own species, we can
simply ask participants about the rules they used in order to perform successfully,
although research shows that these self-reports may not be veridical (Gentner &
Markman 1997). However, one can be successful at some categorization tasks without
ever acquiring a concept that is defined in the same way as it may be by the majority of
humans. In an experiment by Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, Smith, and Lawson (1980)
chimpanzees were required to sort a mixed pile of tools and food into two separate piles
based on these categories. Apes were trained with a small set of objects and were
successfully able to sort new, but familiar, objects during test trials. It is not easy to argue
that this problem was solved on the basis of physical similarity of the test items to the
training items, because it is difficult to identify a set of physical features that an object
must possess in order to be classified as a tool or as food. Instead, these objects may have
been categorized successfully because the subject possessed the concepts “food” and
“tool.” Conversely, these objects may not have been categorized utilizing the same
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meaning to the concepts that we might have. For instance, the chimpanzees may use just
one concept of “food/edible” meaning to them “something I would or have in the past
eaten” and “not food/inedible” for the tools. This type of sorting does not prove that the
animals have indeed acquired a “tool” concept. Although we could be using the same
strategy with similar names for the concepts that differentiate the classes of objects, we
tend also to devise a unique and more specific concept for sets of objects that describe
how they are related to each other, rather than simply how they are unlike those objects
that fall under another concept (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1980).
Like chimpanzees sorting slides into tool and. food groups, capuchin monkeys
have proven proficient at sorting pictures into person/nonperson groups. In the case of
capuchin monkeys sorting photos based on the “person” concept (D’Amato & Van Sant,
1988), categorization may mimic how humans view the person concept. D’Amato and
Van Sant trained capuchin monkeys to categorize photographs based on the “human”
concept. Monkeys discriminated between slides containing humans from those not
containing human figures. Although monkeys were successful on the task, D’Amato and
Van Sant found several interesting errors by analyzing individual test trials. Any
nonperson slide that contained a red patch (i.e., other animals or fruits) was more likely to
be classified as belonging to the person category. It is therefore possible that a “red
patch” was a feature that the monkeys determined sufficient for responding and that it
acquired considerable associative strength, presumably because it is common to many
faces and resulted in a high level of responding whenever it was presented. The primary
way we know that humans use a true “person” concept rather than a “red patch” concept
is by asking them.
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Bovet and Vauclair (2001) similarly investigated abstract concept formation in
baboons. Food and nonfood objects were presented to the monkeys with a modified
Wisconsin General Test Apparatus (WGTA). Baboons were trained to pull one of two
ropes corresponding to same or different (S/D) in response to the relation between the
two objects presented. If both objects presented were from the same category
(food/nonfood), pulling the rope corresponding to same was the correct response. When
one food and one nonfood were presented simultaneously, pulling the different rope was
the correct response. Although the authors suggested that success on the part of the
monkeys to complete the task was adequate demonstration of judgment of conceptual
identity, the results do not imply any sense of relational matching. Making one response
for two food objects versus one food and one nonfood does not imply that the monkeys
have any S/D concept. Rather than implying conceptual labels, the response ropes could
simply symbolize presence or absence of food.
Relational Discriminations
Just as basic concepts act as simplifiers of our world by allowing us to group
objects into categories, abstract concepts provide a means to extend this function beyond
physical or functional similarities (Pearce, 1994). Subjects can choose between
discriminative stimuli based not only on absolute physical properties, but also on
relations between those stimuli that are presented.
Kinnaman (1902) was one of the first to recognize the distinction between types
of discrimination, suggesting that alternative strategies exist to individuals solving these
kinds of tasks. They may rely more on the relative than the absolute properties of the
stimuli. For example, when given a choice between a 4 cm tall box and a 1 cm tall box, a
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subject may first begin choosing under the assumption that the rule is to choose the 4 cm
tall box (based on absolute size). However, when more examples are given, it becomes
apparent that absolute size is not the rule under which the paradigm operates. Rather, one
must compare the two boxes presented and choose the larger of the pair (relative size),
whether it is 1 cm or 4 cm tall. That is, the object that is larger relative to the other object.
Kirkpatrick-Steger and Wasserman (2000) investigated pigeon’s abilities to
discriminate among stimuli using relative information of shape and location. Pigeons
were trained to peck a pairs of shapes that were arranged in one of several different
configurations in relation to each other. Some items were, for example, “to the right of”
or “on top of” the second item of the pair. Rather than attending to the specific shapes
included in the sample, pigeons were required on some trials to attend specifically to the
relation of one object relative to the other. Whereas some pigeons were unable to
overcome the salience of shape, others succeeded in learning relative configural rules.
Analogical Reasoning
Analogical reasoning, Halford and Graeme (1992) argued, is the mechanism that
allows for all conceptual thinking, including logical inference. Knowledge about
analogies forces explicit expression of conceptual knowledge, unlike simple
discriminations that may rely on more implicit types of conceptual knowledge (Premack,
1986). In an analogy, a relationship must be established between the first two elements in
the series. Then, and only then, can one continue to the second set of elements and seek
the same relation between them. By discriminating between two abstract relations, one is
able to acquire the knowledge needed to complete and construct analogies, much like the
chimpanzee, Sarah (Premack, 1983). Sarah was given a variety of analogical reasoning
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problems using arrays of meaningful plastic chips of different colors and shapes. Two
tangible plastic objects that varied on one dimension (i.e., color, shape, or size) were
placed to the left of a center chip which signified same. To the right of the same symbol
was placed only one object. The task thus required the chimpanzee to perceive the
relationship between the shapes on the left and recreate its analog to the right of the
center chip. Not only was Sarah able to complete the task with flat geometric shapes, but
she was also successful when the items presented were everyday three-dimensional
objects (Gillan, Premack, & Woodruff, 1981).
Along the primate lineage, species more closely related to humans have many
common cognitive abilities, including the capacity for judging relations-betweenrelations through the further application of conceptual knowledge. Many ape species,
including humans, are therefore considered “analogical” because of their adept ability to
represent the world propositionally. The fundamental distinction between monkeys and
apes is in their explicit conceptual capacities. Monkeys accept identity based upon
identical features, whereas humans (and other ape species) accept it on the basis of
identical subject matter. Monkeys, therefore, can be thought of as “paleo-logicians” in
the sense that they form common class concepts of identity on the basis of common
physical features. This is not because monkeys do not represent their world, but rather
because they appear not to represent it propositionally (Thompson & Oden, 2000). Rather
than recalling representations of the meaning expressed in what they see, monkeys tend
to represent their environments exactly as they are expressed.
Some abstract relations can be visually perceived at some level and are
subsequently easier to process. Abstract perceptual relations can be visualized, but
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require some level of abstract conceptualization, possibly at a lesser degree, compared to
other abstract relations. Fortes, Merchant, and Georgopoulos (2004) investigated spatial
judgments in animals by evaluating the ways in which the rhesus monkey acquired the
concepts of high and low. Differentiating between high and low is a rather easy task for
human adults. In a delayed matching-to-sample task, a rhesus monkey determined
whether lines on a computer screen should be categorized as high or low. Beginning with
the extremes (top and bottom) of the computer monitor, bars were displayed at varying
heights. After each bar was presented for one second, choice stimuli appeared (similar
bars at the extreme top and bottom of the screen) allowing the monkey to respond high or
low. Throughout a testing session, bars varied in height, with many hovering around the
midline of the screen. As for humans, these bars proved more difficult to classify by the
monkey. The monkey was able to generate an abstract notion of a midline in a fashion
similar to adult humans. This evidence supports the notion that nonhuman primates can
generate an abstract perceptual concept.
In addition to examining the absolute acquisition of such concepts, Fortes,
Merchant, and Georgopoulos (2004) sought to determine how the concepts are
represented in nonhuman animals. In humans, similar concepts may be represented either
semantically, or by an analog comparison model. One way that this can be examined is
by the existence of the congruity effect. The congruity effect occurs when there is a
decrease in the response time when the objects compared are closer to the category pole.
In this instance, when bars are closer to the midline, response time may increase. Upon
determination of the existence of the congruity effect in the rhesus monkey, an analog
comparison is more likely to be favored by nonhuman animals (Fortes et al., 2004).
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Same and Different
The judgment of same versus different (S/D) is such an exceedingly
straightforward one for humans that it often becomes difficult to make comparisons and
describe events without these words. For this reason, Premack and Premack (2003) called
same and different “early concepts”. When making comparisons between objects or
events in the world, the same-different distinction is many times our first approach,
conveying the most useful information (Premack, 1976). Responding differentially to
groups of same or different items seems an almost trivial task. For humans, however, the
S/D rule of discrimination is one that we have come to rely on, and tend to use readily.
Making relational judgments, although simple and obvious to adult humans, may not be a
simple and obvious default rule for discrimination groups of objects for other species
(Premack & Premack, 2003).
Whereas it is often difficult to describe relations without using the words same
and different, the abstract concepts have no linguistic prerequisites (Premack, 1976). The
words can be applied to objects that themselves do not have names. In addition, when
using relation-level problem solving, the name of the objects is irrelevant. Rather, the
relation between the objects is the only relevant information. In relational matching tasks,
an individual must abandon ordinary matching entirely and move to a different level of
problem solving--the relational level (Premack & Premack, 2003). To complete a
relational match-to-sample successfully, participants must direct questioning to “what is
the relationship between the members of each pair?” Labeling of the pairs is the
necessary component to any relational match-to-sample task. So, participants must match
self-given labels of pairs rather than the pairs themselves. Dependence on labels brings
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to the forefront the question of whether language may be necessary to make judgments of
relations between relations (Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997). Can we sufficiently
label objects without language? If the answer to this question is “no,” then we should not
be surprised by Premack’s suggestion that participants, human or nonhuman, cannot
complete a relational matching task without extensive language training. However, if
effective labeling for relational information can be accomplished without language per
se, then we should expect language-naïve nonhuman species also to succeed on tasks
requiring analogical thinking.
Throughout recent years, several studies have indicated that Premack might have
been right: language training is necessary when relational problem-solving skills are
required (Shyan & Wright, 1993; Thompson & Oden, 1996 Wright & Santiago, 1984).
Related research shows, however, that nonhuman animals such as pigeons and monkeys
possess implicit knowledge of the concepts of same and different, no matter how limited
and different from our own knowledge of the concepts (Fagot et al., 2001; Wasserman et
al., 2002; Wright et al., 2003).
Two types of studies comprise a majority of the S/D concept literature:
acquisition of the concepts themselves and their application to the judgment of abstract
relations. To determine the acquisition of the concepts themselves, subjects typically
need only to respond differentially to groupings of exemplars that are either all identical
or all different. When applying the judgments to abstract relations, subjects often must
use the concepts as the basis for their future behavior and match one set of exemplars to
another set on the basis that the relation is the same for the sets.
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The matching concept itself is abstract (Wright, 1997). It is abstract because it
transcends the stimuli used to train it and is distinct from “natural” concepts which are
categories unified by some specific stimulus attribute or attributes. In the traditional
match-to-sample paradigm, pigeons (Wright, 1997) and rhesus monkeys (Washburn,
Rumbaugh, & Richardson, 1992; Washburn & Astur, 1998) were capable of responding
on the basis of the simple if/then statement: “if sample equals A, then choose A not B.”
However, when tested on novel stimuli in transfer tests, pigeons often failed the task.
They had learned the configural patterns necessary for performance on training tests, but
had not truly learned the concept necessary to succeed on transfer tests. That is, they do
not typically learn the matching concept. The reason that pigeons may learn configural
patterns instead of abstract concepts may reflect their learning predisposition (Wright,
1997). Concept learning requires that subjects learn to relate one stimulus to another – to
relate each comparison stimulus to the sample stimulus.
Cook, Katz, and Cavoto (1997) examined the acquisition of the S/D concepts
through the use of a two-choice discrimination task by pigeons. Birds were presented
displays from four distinct domains classified as either the same or different: texture,
feature, geometric, and object. The use of four different display types was integral in
determining whether the birds truly acquired the concepts of same and different as we
understand them so that they can be universally applied across different domains. Same
displays consisted of the repetition of a single element throughout a 24 x 6 array. In the
different displays, an 8 x 7 region of contrasting elements (differing in either shape or
color) was randomly located within the larger array. Texture displays appeared uniform,
with the exception of a nonidentical patch of simulated texture for different displays.
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Geometric patters were arrays approximately six of the same geometric object, or arrays
of five of the same and one odd object. Object displays were patterned in the same
fashion, but were made of actual clipart pictures rather than simple geometric objects.
Pigeons were tested on all four types of displays presented on a computer monitor. After
50 sessions of testing concurrently across all display types, pigeons had readily learned a
same-different discrimination. The rate and general pattern of responding was
approximately the same for all types of displays, lending support that the concepts are
applied identically across different domains. A single generalized rule was most likely
used to discriminate all display types. These results provided some of the first strong
evidences that pigeons, like many primates, can learn and abstract, visually mediated S/D
concept (Cook et al., 1997).
Shields, Smith, and Washburn (1997) presented monkeys with a S/D task in
which the discrimination required was between boxes containing various amounts of
pixilation. The main goal of this study was to examine the uncertainty response as it
applies to judgments of same versus different. Pairs of pixel boxes were presented on a
computer screen with a star (a previously used symbol for escape) and a “D.” If the pixel
boxes matched in their amount of pixilation (i.e. their “sparseness” or “denseness”), the
correct choice was to move the cursor in contact with the box pair. If the boxes were
illuminated with different amounts of pixels, choosing “D” was correct. As the density
ratio between the two boxes approached 1.0, the same-different distinction became
increasingly different, leading to a choice of the star to escape the trial. This evidence
supports the notion that monkeys may understand the S/D distinction along a continuum.
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After several training sessions, monkeys discriminated between same and different
relations with a great deal of accuracy.
Identity and Nonidentity
Researchers have demonstrated that nonhuman animals can learn to discriminate
large arrays in which all of the items are physically identical or nonidentical to each other
(Wasserman et al., 2001). That is, they can detect perceptual similarities and differences.
Evidence is insufficient, however, to suggest that their concepts of sameness and
difference operate in a way that is congruous to our own. One caveat to the above
mentioned studies is that the animals are unable to make such distinctions when the
arrays contain fewer than 6-8 items, suggesting that subjects are actually relying on
variability or entropy in order to succeed at the task. Rather than recalling a
representation of difference, animals may be perceiving the amount of perceptual
variance or regularity to be greater in the different arrays than in the same arrays (Fagot et
al., 2001). When the number of items displayed decreases, we observe depreciation in
the animals’ ability to discriminate.
Entropy: Same vs. Different?
In a series of experiments with pigeons (Young & Wasserman, 1997) the effects
of number of items in a given display as it relates to the rate of concept acquisition was
investigated. After several animal species were shown to fail on tasks involving the
categorization of just two visual items as the same or different (Santiago and Wright,
1984), Wasserman and colleagues devised a task that would make these types of tasks
easier. Perhaps, they reasoned, there is simply not enough information in a two-item
display to convey the concepts of sameness and difference. For this reason, Wasserman’s
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studies typically introduce animals to arrays of 16 or more items for discrimination (see
Figure 1).
The notion of entropy describes the phenomena that might occur when success in
these types of paradigms is contingent upon the number of items in a display. Entropy is
described as the amount of change or variability that is perceived within a grouping of
items. This idea was put forth by Shannon and Weaver (1949). To compute entropy one
can use the following equation, where H(A) is the entropy of a categorical variable A, a is
a category of A, and pa is the proportion of observed values within that category:
H(A) = - Σ pa log2 pa
Thus, in a 16-item array of all identical items, entropy is independent of the number of
items: entropy = 0 (for any set of identical items). Changing the number of exemplars in
the sample display should not change the amount of pictured variability. For different
displays, however, reducing the number of items in the sample would reduce the amount
of pictured variability. With only two pictured items, the variability of different sample
displays (entropy = 1) is numerically closer to 16-item same samples (entropy = 0) than it
is to 16-item different samples (entropy = 4).
Pigeons proved successful in transferring their knowledge to novel stimuli,
lending support that S/D concepts were truly formed. In addition, both species were
strongly controlled by the entropy of sample displays. Both humans and baboons used the
entropy of the sample to guide their choice behavior.
However, the key distinction between the species is where they set the entropy
cutoff for these displays. It appears that humans set that cutoff near 0, whereas baboons
set that cutoff near the midpoint range of the entropy scores, here approximately 2.
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Figure 1.Entropy-Infused Displays Presented to Pigeons in Wasserman, Young, and
Peissig, (2002).
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Following the finding that baboons could also successfully differentiate between
S/D 16-icon displays (Wasserman et al., 2001 in a two-choice task, discrimination of
second order relations was examined. Fagot, Wasserman, and Young (2001) investigated
whether baboons could discriminate same from different using their abilities to judge
relations-between-relations in a delayed relational match-to-sample task (RMTS). For
comparison purposes, adult humans were also required to complete the same task. 16icon arrays were again used as stimuli, but were presented in the MTS format. One array
appeared on the computer screen as the sample array, followed by a small delay and the
presentation of two choice arrays, only one of the choice arrays being of the same
relational type as the sample. Two baboons successfully learned the RMTS. That is, they
accurately picked the choice display that involved the same relation among the 16 icons
(same or different) as in the sample display. The acquisition of RMTS for baboons was
comparatively slow. In the final four sessions after approximately 6,000 trials, baboons
averaged 84% correct. In addition, success on same trials was acquired at a more rapid
rate. In comparison, humans were approximately 100% accurate on both stimulus types
within the first 100 trials. After continued training, it was determined that given enough
trials (more than 10,000), one baboon successfully discriminated (81% correct) S/D
displays of only 3 items.
In a second experiment, Wasserman, Young, and Fagot (2001) compared the
effects of number of icons between species. As in previous studies, performance on the
delayed MTS task dropped sharply if the number of icons in the display was reduced
below 8 items (after which performance did not exceed 63%). In contrast, display set size
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had no effect on adult human participants. Performance did not diminish as set size
decreased for humans as it did for baboons.
Rather than training and requiring subjects to respond to abstract conceptual
stimuli in order to obtain reward, implicit discriminations enable us to examine how
animals may be predisposed to process stimuli. Wasserman, Frank, and Young (2002)
asked whether pigeons might exhibit relational stimulus control that did not explicitly
require S/D discrimination. As in previous experiments (Fagot et al., 2001; Wasserman et
al., 2001), pigeons viewed arrays of icons that were either all the same as each other or all
different from each other. In addition, arrays were composed of icons from one of two
sets, creating four distinct array types: different-1, different-2, same-1, and same-2.
Different-1 and same-1 arrays contained icons from the same library, but never from icon
set 2. One of the four types of arrays was designated as the S+, associated with reward.
The other three, however, were not. On any given trial, only one type of array was
displayed at a time. Pecks to the S+ displays delivered food regardless of whether the
pigeons also pecked the S- stimuli. Each pigeon was therefore free to respond as it chose,
with different patterns of responding to the four kinds of discriminative stimuli allocating
attention in one of four ways: icon set alone, relation among the icons alone, both
properties, or neither of the properties of the displays. In training trials, all four stimulus
types were rewarded, while in discrimination trials, only one types of array was
designated the S+. The authors argued, consistent with Goldstone and Barsalou (1998),
that it may be more appropriate to view the task as falling somewhere on a perceptualconceptual continuum. Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) stated that many phenomena we
view as conceptual actually may be the result of perceptual processes becoming “less
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bound to the perceptual specifics” (p. 256) of the stimuli. Therefore, the degree to which
a process is conceptual is dependent upon the degree to which it is free of perceptual
details (Wasserman, et al., 2002).
An interesting find from their previous study (Fagot et al., 2001) was a difference
in the acquisition rates of the S/D concept for baboons. Criterion for same trials was
attained more quickly than different. By varying the amount of variation in stimulus
displays, Young and Wasserman (2002) examined properties that seem to make
uniformity special. Entropy, the amount of variation within a display, is known to play
an important role in the acquisition of abstract concepts. Pigeons as well as baboons and
rhesus monkeys seem to have trouble detecting variety when a set consists of fewer than
8 items. By varying the number of distinct items within a different array, entropy is
altered. For example, a 16-item array with all 16 distinct items (akin to those displays
used in all previous Wasserman studies) has an entropy level of 4. However, a 16-item
array with only 8 distinct items (each duplicated once) has an entropy of only 2.
In this study, Young and Wasserman (2002) evaluated the extent to which a
display is classified as different based on how different it really is. Pigeon and adult
human participants made S/D discriminations between displays while the arrays to be
compared were not of equivalent entropy. Entropy varied from 0 (16 all identical) to 4
(16 all distinct) in increments of 0.5. When discrimination involved comparing a different
array of entropy 4 to one of lesser entropy, S/D accuracy decreased with increased
entropy. Along the entropy continuum, displays were discriminated asymmetrically:
values at the lower end of the entropy scale were much more easily distinguished than
those at the upper end of the scale. It was easier for both humans and pigeons (although
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to a slightly lesser extent) to discriminate an entropy = 0 display from those with higher
entropy than to discriminate an entropy = 4 display from those with lower entropy. When
even a small amount of variability is introduced into a display, it becomes significantly
more difficult to discriminate. These findings suggest that uniformity is saliently different
from higher levels of entropy.
Critical Factors in Learning the S/D Distinction
In contrast to entropy-related studies in which the number of items simultaneously
presented served as a critical factor, Katz, Wright, and Bachevalier (2002) identified
training stimulus set size as crucial to S/D abstract concept learning by rhesus monkeys.
An increased set size has the advantage of drawing attention from aspects of individual
exemplars and placing emphasis on the relation between them. With small set sizes,
individual features of objects may become the controlling cue, whereas in large stimulus
sets individual features change frequently enough that stimulus relationships such as the
S/D distinction are able to emerge as the basis for further discrimination (Katz et al.,
2002). Further, with larger set sizes, issues of proactive interference are a more minimal
factor. If the present stimulus is unique in the learning history of the animal, previous
associations with that stimulus cannot be recalled. Katz and colleagues. (2002) found that
an increase in training set size is associated with a decrease in the number of trials to
criterion for rhesus monkeys. In addition, with larger set sizes, higher levels of accuracy
were achieved.
After being trained on a two-choice S/D discrimination task using a set size of
only 8 photographic stimuli, animals began a transfer test with novel sets of stimuli. New
sets contained between 8 and 128 unique stimuli. All animals completed transfer tests
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stimuli sets of several different sizes. As set size increased, the number of trials to
criterion decreased. The more exemplars contained in the stimuli set, the more quickly
the same/different distinction was made. However, for sets above 32 exemplars, animals
all performed significantly above chance after only approximately 100 trials. Rather than
being an “all-or-nothing” phenomenon, abstract concept learning may rely heavily on
larger set sizes. Abstract conceptual learning with significantly smaller stimulus sets may
never emerge, whereas an abundance of exemplars help animals to break free from a
predisposition to item-specific learning (Katz et al., 2002).
Capuchin monkeys were presented with a task similar to that completed by rhesus
monkeys in previous experiments (Katz et al., 2002). As set size increased, transfer
performance also increased. However, capuchin monkeys learned the S/D task and
abstract concepts much more rapidly than rhesus monkeys trained in the same procedure.
Capuchins tended to learn the task in one-fifth the amount of transfer sessions as rhesus
monkeys.
Whereas Fagot and colleagues (2001) have demonstrated that at least two
baboons would have marked difficulty on a relational match-to-sample (RMTS) task,
rhesus monkeys at the Language Research Center (LRC) with extensive testing
experience were presented with the task in order to verify these results with trial-unique
stimuli (Flemming et al., 2005). In an experiment motivated by the views of Washburn,
Thomspon, and Oden (1997), pairs of images were used as stimuli in a matching-tosample task. One stimulus pair (composed either of two identical or two different trialunique randomly drawn images) served as the sample. After contact was made with this
object (via a cursor controlled by a joystick), choice pairs were presented on each side of
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the bottom half of the screen. One choice pair was composed of two identical images (but
different from any of those present in the sample pair) and the other was made of two
images that differed physically from each other. Monkeys were required to choose the
pair which matched the same relation (either same or different) of the sample pair. After
verifying that monkeys fail on such a task, several other steps were taken to determine
why they failed and whether they could be trained to succeed in such a task.
A series of experiments was designed beginning with the most basic of
discriminations: a two-choice paradigm (Flemming et al., 2005). Throughout the course
of the experiments, several conclusions could be made about the acquisition of concepts
by rhesus monkeys: implicitly, their concepts for same and different may be better
described as uniformity and chaos, respectively, increasing the entropy of a display acts
as a means to learn said concepts, and discriminative cues are integral for proficient
success. In Experiments 1 and 2, we found that pairs of images may present a unique
problem for the monkeys. In a simple two-choice discrimination paradigm, monkeys
completed over 10,000 trials with chance levels of accuracy. Paired images were spread
farther apart by space and separated with lines (see Figure 2). However, side biases
revealed that all five monkeys had no particular strategy with which to solve the task.
From this, we concluded that the monkeys may not have perceived the pairs as such. That
is, they were seeing the pair of images as one stimulus “bunch” rather than a pair of two
identical or nonidentical images.
In Experiment 3, groups of eight identical and nonidentical stimuli were presented
in place of pairs (see Figure 3). Monkeys quickly learned their assigned S+.
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Figure 2. Paired-Image Displays Presented to Rhesus Monkeys in Experiment 2 of
Flemming, Beran, and Washburn, 2005.
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Figure 3. Entropy-Infused Displays Presented to Rhesus Monkeys in Experiment 3 of
Flemming, Beran, and Washburn, 2005.
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However, when the S+ switched from same to different (or from different to
same), all monkeys perseverated on their initially rewarded stimulus for thousands of
trials.
To give the monkeys a better indication of the S+, we introduced background
color as a discriminative cue in Experiment 4. With the entropy of the displays increased
(set size = 8), monkeys successfully discriminated between rows of identical and
nonidentical images when accompanied by an S+ specific background color. When same
was the designated S+, the background color was pink. A black background served as an
indicator for an S+ of different. We hypothesized that these background colors functioned
as referential labels for the rewarded stimulus. Gradually, the number of items in the
displays was reduced to a pair, which now proved no more difficult than sets of 8. In
contrast to Fagot, Wasserman, and Young’s (2001) work with baboons and Wasserman,
Frank, and Young’s (2002) work with pigeons, we found that rhesus monkeys are
capable of accurately making the distinction between pairs of identical and nonidentical
images.
Abstract Concepts and Language
Premack (1976, 1983, 1986) suggested that, at least in the case of abstract
relations, acquisition of conceptual knowledge depends upon language. Therefore, it
should come as no surprise that while language-naïve nonhuman animals show varying
degrees of perception-based conceptual knowledge, they lack the capacity to understand
abstract concepts such as same and different to the same extent as humans understand
them (Premack, 1983, 1986; Thompson, 1995; Thompson & Oden, 2000).

27

Language has further been implicated as the main mechanism responsible for
judgment of relations-between-relations—that is, second-order relations (Premack, 1976,
1983; Premack & Premack, 2003; Thompson & Oden, 2000).
Before Wasserman and colleagues demonstrated that pigeons and some baboons
may have this ability (i.e., Fagot et al., 2001; Wasserman et al., 2002), only adult humans
and language-trained chimpanzees had been shown to display abstract relational
matching skills. Thompson, Oden, and Boysen (1997) revisited this accusation by
presenting language-naïve chimpanzees with a conceptual matching-to-sample task. After
being familiarized with a physical match-to-sample task, five adult chimpanzees viewed
paired random junk objects as sample and choice stimuli. As in several previous tasks
(i.e., Fagot et al., 2001), the goal was to indicate the choice pair that conveyed the same
relation between the objects as the sample pair.
Four of five chimpanzees spontaneously judged the conceptual equivalence of
relations-between-relations. The fifth chimpanzee differed in his learning history; he was
naïve with respect to numeric problem solving and symbolic token training in addition to
language training. Therefore, it seems that these tokens may have a functional role in the
acquisition of abstract concepts. Thompson and Oden (1996) suggested that the critical
role of the token is to provide an animal with a concrete icon for encoding a propositional
representation that is otherwise abstract. In the context of abstract relational matching-tosample, the token may “objectify” a relationship or have the retrieval function of a word
(Thompson et al., 1997). Thompson, Oden, and Boysen (1997) also suggested that
conceptual-relational matching is akin to covert symbol matching.
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Thompson and colleagues (1997) hypothesized that the judgment of relationsbetween-relations is made possible by the animal’s representational capacity to re-encode
abstract relations into iconically equivalent symbols. It should follow then, that such
symbolic training produces a system for universal computation.
By comparing directly three distinct primate species, differences in performance
may reflect evolutionary change as a function of relatedness to a common primate
ancestor. Because analogical reasoning cannot be reduced to stimulus-response (S-R)
learning, it is reasonable to expect that, like emergent behaviors, we should note a
qualitative shift in relation to cranial capacity (Rumbaugh, 2002). Because rhesus
monkeys are more distantly related to humans than are chimpanzees, similarities in
analogical reasoning skills may suggest that the phenomenon was in existence for a large
part of primate evolutionary history. Chimpanzees diverged from the common primate
ancestor more recently than rhesus monkeys, with respect to humans. Therefore,
behaviors observed only in chimpanzees and humans, but not rhesus monkeys, may be a
more recent development in cognitive evolution.
The purpose of the current project was to determine the role of meaning in the
analogical reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Such comparisons outline
further our understanding of the cognitive capacities of various species and further our
knowledge about concepts and mechanisms of concepts learning in general. According to
Thompson and colleagues (1997), the capacity to re-code abstract relations (such as
same-different) is solely responsible for success in conceptual relational matching. Such a
recoding would require animals to have an explicit symbol or token consistently
associated with the abstract relations themselves. Perhaps, rather than a strict language
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system, meaningfulness of stimuli plays the pivotal role in the acquisition of abstract
concepts. According to this hypothesis, as long as meaning can be attributed to individual
stimuli, nonhuman animals will begin to recognize pairs as matched or nonmatched in
meaning, rather than perception.
Method
Participants
Three groups of participants were tested on the analogical reasoning task: adult
humans, rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).
Eighty-two undergraduates (67 females) were recruited from Georgia State
University’s psychology research pool with half assigned to each stimulus condition
(meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli) in the relational match-to-sample task. The
mean age of the participants was 20 years and 60% were minority students. All
participants completed an informed consent form and received debriefing instructions
upon completion of the task.
Four chimpanzees (18 to 34 years of age) housed at Georgia State University’s
Language Research Center (LRC) were also tested. The chimpanzees had previously
participated in experiments involving the simple match-to-sample paradigm with
joysticks (Beran & Washburn, 2002), but were naïve to the specific testing procedures
involving the S/D concepts. Individuals were randomly assigned to receive one of two
conditions (meaningful and nonmeaningful lexigram stimuli) first, followed by
completion of the remaining condition. The chimpanzees were not food or water
deprived. Individuals worked at mobile testing systems at their home cages for
designated 1-hour sessions each day.
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Five male rhesus monkeys (10 to 20 years of age) housed at the LRC also
completed the relational match-to-sample task. Like the chimpanzees, the monkeys had
been previously trained on simple physical match-to-sample tasks (MTS) with joysticks
where correct responses were exact physical matches to target stimuli (Washburn et al.,
1992; Washburn & Astur, 1998). Individuals were randomly assigned to receive one of
two conditions (meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli) first, followed by completion of
the remaining condition. The monkeys were not food or water deprived for purposes of
testing, and allowed to work ad libitum throughout the day in their home cages.
All monkeys began this study with previous experience on other tasks involving
the same-different paradigm. In the Flemming, Beran, and Washburn (2005) study,
monkeys discriminated between arrays composed of identical or nonidentical clipart
images. In the presence of a discriminative color cue, monkeys successfully
discriminated same from different displays of 8, 6, 4, and 2 items. In addition, monkeys
completed, but failed RMTS tasks similar to those in the current study, but composed
only of clipart images.
Apparatus
The LRC’s Computerized Test System (LRC-CTS) consists of an IBMcompatible desktop personal computer (Washburn et al., 1992). This same apparatus was
used throughout all parts of the project, with slight variations for each species.
Undergraduate students at Georgia State University were tested at a desktop computer
using a hand-held joystick. Each nonhuman animal had access to its own testing station.
During tasks, monkeys controlled a cursor on a 17-inch SVGA monitor via a verticallymounted joystick. The monitor was positioned approximately 15 cm from the home cage
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behind a transparent Lexan plate. Chimpanzees controlled a horizontally-mounted
joystick within a port attached to their home cages; stimuli were presented on a monitor
approximately 1m outside of the home cage on a mobile cart.
Speakers provided auditory feedback for all tasks, including a low buzzing sound
for incorrect choices and an increasing crescendo sound for correct choices. These sounds
have been paired with these outcomes on many previous tasks. For the current tasks, the
increasing crescendo sound was always accompanied by the dispensing of a 94-mg
banana-flavored pellet to rhesus monkeys and small portions of fruit or 1-g pellet to the
chimpanzees.
Design and Procedure
To investigate the role of meaning in the acquisition of abstract relational
concepts in the proposed study, the three different species completed comparable tasks.
Human adults, chimpanzees, and rhesus monkeys completed two relational match-tosample (RMTS) tasks that differ on one dimension. In one condition, the stimuli
conveyed no meaning to the participant, whereas in the other condition, stimuli carried
discreet, specific meanings. Participants completed both tasks in a randomized design,
with some individuals receiving the meaningful condition first and others receiving the
nonmeaningful condition first.
Task
In the RMTS task, stimuli were presented in pairs with one sample pair and two
choice pairs. At the initiation of a trial, one pair of stimuli (either two identical or
nonidentical objects) was centered at the top of the computer screen; stimuli were
approximately 5 cm x 3 cm. Participants were required to contact this sample pair with
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the stimuli in order for the choice pairs to appear. Once contact with the sample pair was
made, the joystick cursor was re-centered on the screen, and the choice pairs appeared in
the bottom half of the screen on the left and right sides. One choice pair contained two
identical items, whereas the other contained two physically nonidentical items.
Importantly, no stimulus in the choice pairs was ever physically identical to stimuli in the
sample pair and was randomly assigned to position. The task, then, for example, was to
match AA with BB (and not CD) and to match EF with GH (and not JJ). Similar testing
paradigms have been frequently utilized (Premack, 1976; Thompson & Oden, 2000;
Flemming et al., 2005). Successful performance of the conceptual-relation matching task
required that the participants judge one relation to be the same or different from another
relation.
To make a response, the cursor was moved either left or right toward the choice
pairs. Once contact was made with a choice pair, a feedback sound was played (an
increasing tone if the choice was correct or a buzzing if incorrect) followed by rewards
on correct trials for nonhuman animals and a short intertrial interval (ITI) until the sample
pair for the next trial appears. For correct choices, rewards were automatically dispensed
to the animals accompanied by a 2-s ITI. When choices were incorrect, no food reward
was dispensed and longer ITIs were imposed (15 s for rhesus monkeys and 5 s for
chimpanzees). Humans, however, received instruction as to the meaning of the feedback
sounds. This was the only instruction they received. In addition, humans received no food
reward and 2-s ITIs for both correct and incorrect choices. After the ITI, the next trial
was automatically initiated and the next sample pair appears at top of the screen.
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Stimuli were selected from one of two separate conditions for each participant or
animal: meaningful or nonmeaningful. In the meaningful condition, stimuli were discreet
symbols that had meaning specific to the species.
Stimuli
Humans. Meaningful stimuli were composed of 3- to 7-letter words that referred
to concrete objects such as foods and places. Nonmeaningful stimuli were composed of
3- to 7-letter strings of illegal nonwords generated by the program WordGen (Duyck,
Desment, Verbeke & Brysbaert, 2004). Illegal nonwords were chosen as appropriate
nonmeaningful stimuli because they carry with them no inherent referential value, and
cannot be recoded into sensible phonemes in the English language. Both sets of stimuli
appeared as white letters inside a black rectangle. Figure 4 portrays example displays
presented to human participants.
Chimpanzees. Lexigrams are symbolic characters that convey special meaning of
real-world objects to the chimpanzees. Through specialized training, the animals learned
to communicate with the researchers and one another about certain foods, places, people,
and activities (Rumbaugh, 1977; Savage-Rumbaugh, Fields, & Taglialatela, 2001;
Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1980; Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003). The LRC chimpanzees
have been shown to retain the meaning of these symbols for more than 20 years (Beran,
Pate, Richardson, & Rumbaugh, 2000). In addition, the animals sort lexigrams into
labeled groups more accurately than real-world objects and photographs (SavageRumbaugh et al., 1980).
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Figure 4. Example Displays Presented to Human Participants
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Only lexigrams with which the chimpanzees have had extensive experience and
have been shown to retain meaning for the animals were presented during the meaningful
condition. These lexigrams may function more like whole words for the animals carrying
with them a specialized meaning (Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003). Exemplars from an
unknown, never before seen subset of lexigrams were used as nonmeaningful for
chimpanzees (see Figure 5).
For the first two sessions (20 to 30 trials) animals were hand-fed with preferred
fruits after the selection of correct choices. Because animals were distracted by
experimenter presence, oftentimes not attending to the computer screen during trials, the
automatic pellet dispenser was utilized throughout subsequent testing sessions.
Monkeys. Although the rhesus monkeys had seen lexigram stimuli in previous
studies, these animals had never been trained on lexigrams meanings. There is sufficient
evidence however that monkeys can at least use symbols as labels for certain concepts. In
tasks presented to the rhesus monkeys at the LRC, Arabic numerals have been paired
with specific numbers of pellets, possibly allowing the animals to associate these numeric
symbols with quantity information (Rumbaugh & Washburn, 1991; Washburn, 1994).
In addition to simple quantity information that numerals may convey, Arabic
numerals have also produced Stroop-like effects in rhesus monkeys at the LRC. Because
meaning of the numerals interferes with judgments about amount, numerals mean
amounts, and thus can be said to have symbolic representation for the monkeys
(Washburn, 1994).
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Figure 5. Example Displays Presented to Chimpanzees
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Adding to the repertoire of what Arabic numerals mean to the rhesus monkeys at
the LRC is the predictive power of the numeric symbols. Harris & Washburn (2005)
presented the monkeys with series of reinforced and nonreinforced maze trials in which
Arabic numerals indicated the number of reinforced mazes that must be completed before
a nonreinforced maze trial was presented. Monkeys developed a pattern of responding
slower on nonreinforced trials than the preceding reinforced trial; they used the Arabic
numeral as a cue to the number of reinforced maze trials that would occur in a series
(Harris & Washburn, 2005). These previously learned Arabic numerals were utilized in
paired stimuli in the meaningful condition (see Figure 6).
In the nonmeaningful condition, stimuli consisted of basic Latin alphabet letters.
Special attention was given so that letters used in previous tasks for specific choice
responses were not included in the subset of letters used in this task. Choice of letters and
numerals controlled for perceptual qualities of the stimuli by balancing their basic
physical properties.
Results
Humans
Accuracy-by-condition was assessed by comparing the average performance for
the entire 100-trial block between the two groups of participants (meaningful/
nonmeaningful). Participants in the meaningful condition completed the task with an
average accuracy of 93.86 out of 100 trials (SE = 1.73), significantly higher than
participants in the nonmeaningful condition (M = 87.48, SE = 2.47); t(80) = 2.13, p < .05,
d = 6.38.
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Figure 6. Example Displays Presented to Rhesus Monkeys
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Within a 100-trial testing session of either the meaningful or nonmeaningful
stimuli, 76 of 82 participants met the criterion (correct responses to 8 out of the previous
10 trials attempted) for sufficient acquisition of an analogical rule. Two participants who
received the meaningful condition never met a criterial level of accuracy; four
participants assigned to the nonmeaningful condition did not perform at levels
significantly above chance (50%) after 100 trials. These six participants were removed
from analysis for trials-to-criterion and response time.
Because accuracy was generally high for participants in both conditions, the
number of trials-to-criterion was assessed to determine how long participants failed
before realizing the analogical rule. Trials-to-criterion for each participant was calculated
by summing the total number of trials until eight out of the previous ten trials attempted
were completed correctly. Participants in the meaningful condition met criterion on
average within 14.35 trials (SE = 1.38), fewer than the number of trials required for the
participants in the nonmeaningful condition (M = 19.08; SE = 2.60); however, this
difference was not statistically significant, t(74) = 1.65, p = .10, d = 4.73 (see Figure 7).
Response time (time from the appearance of the choice pairs to the selection of
one choice) provides another measure of learning by assessing how long participants
process the stimuli before making a choice. A mixed-design ANOVA revealed a
significant within-subjects main effect (RT before/RT after), but no significant interaction
with the between-subjects factor (meaningful/nonmeaningful). In both conditions,
response time was significantly shorter after criterion was met, F(1,74) = 61.64, p < .01
(see Figure 8).
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Figure 7. Number of Trials to Reach Criterion for Human Participants (error bars
represent standard error)
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Figure 8. Response Times Pre- and Post-Acquisition for Human Participants (error bars
represent standard error)
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Response times both before (RT before) and after (RT after) meeting criterion were
statistically equivalent for both conditions, F(1,74) = 0.88, p = .35.
Chimpanzees
There were individual differences in performance by the chimpanzees on the
RMTS task. Table 1 presents performance summaries for the chimpanzees. Two
chimpanzees (Lana and Mercury) never performed significantly above chance in any
condition—meaningful (lexigrams or numerals) or nonmeaningful—after at least 110
trials in each condition.
In several testing sessions, these animals developed positional biases, choosing
either the left or right stimulus exclusively for a significant number of trials. Mercury
(who received the nonmeaningful condition first) contacted the left pair on 81% of all
trials in the numeral condition, significantly more often than the right pair z = 6.48, p <
.01. In meaningful and nonmeaningful conditions, however, Mercury developed strong
right-side biases: 76%, z = 7.16, p < .01 for meaningful trials; 66%, z = 3.73, p < .01 for
nonmeaningful trials. To illustrate that performance did not improve across trials, Figure
9 presents Mercury’s cumulative percentage of correct responses per trial block in the
three conditions.
Performance was found to be symmetric in all conditions for Mercury. That is,
accuracy on same trials and different trials was statistically equivalent across conditions
“meaningful” lexigrams χ2 (1, 191) = .09, p > .05; nonmeaningful lexigrams χ2 (1, 133) =
.81, p > .05; meaningful (numerals χ2 (1, 110) = .003, p > .05).
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Table 1.
Performance summaries of chimpanzees

Subject

Condition

Lana

Meaningful (lexigrams)

238

52

Nonmeaningful

166

54

Meaningful (numerals)

342

52

Meaningful (lexigrams)

191

49

Nonmeaningful

133

56

Meaningful (numerals)

110

48

Meaningful (lexigrams)

202

66*

Nonmeaningful

186

54

Meaningful (numerals)

286

44

Meaningful (lexigrams)

227

55

Nonmeaningful

263

65*

Meaningful (numerals)

166

54

Mercury

Panzee

Sherman

# of Trials Completed

Percent Correct

* p < 0.05
Note. Number of trials for each individual and condition varies as a result of how many
trials each chimpanzee was able to complete in a given testing session. These data
represent approximately 12 sessions per animal over the span of 21 weeks of testing.
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Figure 9. Percent Correct by 10-Trial Block for Mercury. The solid horizontal line at 50%
represents chance performance.
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Lana (who received the meaningful-lexigrams condition first) also developed a
similar side bias with the meaningful lexigrams, selecting the right stimulus pair in 68%
of all trials, z = 5.70, p < .01. In the nonmeaningful condition, however, Lana developed a
left side bias (68%) in the first 100 trials (z = 3.60, p < .01), and then shifted strategies to
a right bias (67%) in the remaining 66 trials (z = 2.71, p < .01). To illustrate that
performance did not improve across trials, Figure 10 presents Lana’s accuracy per trial
block in the three conditions.
Performance was found to be symmetric in all conditions for Lana. Accuracy on
same trials and different trials was statistically equivalent for meaningful lexigrams χ2 (1,
238) = .96, p > .05; nonmeaningful lexigrams χ2 (1, 166) = .24, p > .05; and for
meaningful numerals χ2 (1, 342) = 1.78, p > .05).
Panzee completed trials with meaningful stimuli before receiving the
nonmeaningful and numeral conditions. She performed at levels above chance in the
meaningful condition completing 66% of 202 trials correctly, z = 4.64, p < .01, but failed
to perform above chance levels in the nonmeaningful and numeral conditions. Figure 11
presents Panzee’s percentage of correct responses as a function of trial block and the
three conditions.
Distribution of accuracy varied by condition for Panzee. Accuracy on same trials
and different trials was statistically equivalent for meaningful conditions: lexigrams χ2 (1,
202) = 2.06, p > .05; numerals χ2 (1, 286) = 2.04, p > .05. In the nonmeaningful condition
(which yielded overall chance performance), accuracy was significantly higher on
different trials (65%) than on same trials (49%), χ2 (1, 186) = 4.61, p < .05.
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Figure 10. Percent Correct by 10-Trial Block for Lana The solid horizontal line at 50%
represents chance performance
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Figure 11. Percent Correct by 10-Trial Block for Panzee. The solid horizontal line at 50%
represents chance performance
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Sherman completed trials with nonmeaningful stimuli before receiving the
meaningful and number conditions. He performed at levels above chance in the
nonmeaningful condition, completing 65.00% of 263 trials correctly, z = 4.99, p < 0.01;
but he failed to reach significance in the meaningful conditions. Figure 12 presents
Sherman’s percentage of correct responses as a function of trial block and the three
conditions.
Distribution of accuracy varied by condition for Sherman. Accuracy on same
trials and different trials was statistically equivalent for meaningful conditions: lexigrams
χ2 (1, 227) = 0.48, p > .05; numerals χ2 (1, 166) = 1.45, p > .05. In the nonmeaningful
condition accuracy was significantly higher on different trials (80.6%) than on same trials
(50%), χ2 (1, 263) = 27.18, p > .05.
For each chimpanzee, accuracy levels were consistent across all trials. No
significant increases in performance across time were observed; no performance plateau
was reached until the last few trials completed. In instances where performance failed to
reach significance, levels of accuracy remained around chance throughout the testing
period. For those instances where chimpanzees did perform above chance levels,
acquisition was spontaneous, rather than resembling gradual learning across trials.
Rhesus Monkeys
Order of presentation for the two conditions, meaningful and nonmeaningful was
counterbalanced with three monkeys receiving nonmeaningful stimuli (letters) first and
the other two monkeys receiving meaningful stimuli (numerals) first.
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The monkeys completed an average of 1,937 trials in each condition, but no
monkey achieved levels of performance significantly above chance on either condition,
regardless of which was presented first. Performance summaries of the rhesus monkeys
are shown in Table 2, with illustrative accuracy levels displayed in Figure 13 for Hank.
The trends of the learning curves presented in Figure 13 are representative of the
performance of all other monkeys in this study. Performance failed to improve across
trials, and position biases emerged for every animal and condition.
If performance gradually improved across trials, eventually approaching
significance, we could conclude that the animals slowly learned an analogical rule
through trial-and-error. This is not the case, as no animal ever reached a level of
performance significantly different from chance. To illustrate that there is no evidence
that performance did not improve across trials, blocks of 100 trials were analyzed
independently for Hank for the first 1,000 trials in both conditions.
Percent correct was not significantly different from chance in any trial block
except for trials 601-700 (60% correct; z = 2.0, p < 0.05) in the nonmeaningful condition.
Subsequent trial blocks rebounded to near chance performance. Table 3 summarizes these
data.
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Table 2.
Performance Summaries of the Rhesus Monkeys

Subject

Condition

Murph

Meaningful

Lou

Willie

Gale

Hank

Trials Completed

% Correct

z

2,766

50

.99

Nonmeaningful

779

48

.61

Meaningful

1,826

51

.94

Nonmeaningful

3,599

48

-2.15*

Meaningful

3,242

50

.21

Nonmeaningful

1,100

48

-.78

Meaningful

1,306

49

-.44

Nonmeaningful

1,174

47

-1.40

Meaningful

2,400

50

.08

Nonmeaningful

1,178

52

1.75

* p < 0.05
Note. Number of trials for each individual and condition varies as a result of how many
trials each monkey was able to complete in a given testing session. These data represent
approximately ten sessions over the span of two weeks.
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Table 3.
Analysis by 100-Trial Blocks for Hank

Meaningful

Nonmeaningful

% correct

z

% correct

z

1-100

46

-0.8

53

0.6

101-200

43

-1.4

54

0.8

201-300

57

1.4

50

0.0

301-400

42

-1.6

50

0.0

401-500

54

0.8

59

1.8

501-600

53

0.6

49

-0.2

601-700

53

0.6

60

2.0*

701-800

43

-1.4

56

1.2

801-900

53

0.6

45

-1.0

901-1000

56

1.2

42

-1.6

* p <0.05
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All but one monkey completed same and different trials with equivalent levels of
accuracy in every condition; their treatment of same and different trials was symmetric
(Murph-numerals χ2 (1, 2766) = .92, p > .05; Murph-letters χ2 (1, 779) = .24, p > .05;
Lou-numerals χ2 (1, 1826) = .07, p > .05; Lou-letters χ2 (1, 3599) = .03, p > .05; Willienumerals χ2 (1, 3242) = .87, p > .05; Willie-letters χ2 (1, 1100) = .05, p > .05; Galenumerals χ2 (1, 1306) = .23, p > .05; Gale-letters χ2 (1, 1174) = 2.43, p > .05; Hanknumerals χ2 (1, 2399) = 2.12, p > .05). In the nonmeaningful condition, Hank completed
same trials (56.12%) with significantly greater accuracy than different trials (48.70%) (χ2
(1, 1178) = 6.60, p > .05).
As with the chimpanzees, positional biases also tended to shift between conditions
for each animal. For instance, if the animal developed a right bias in the nonmeaningful
condition, in the subsequent meaningful condition, a left-side bias emerged. After
prolonged failure, all side biases were evident within the first 500 trials. Table 4
summarizes position biases observed for rhesus monkeys.

Discussion
Humans
For human participants, the known, discrete meaning of stimuli appeared to
facilitate the acquisition of an analogical rule. Although performance was generally high
across conditions, participants in the meaningful condition performed at significantly
higher rates of accuracy than those in the nonmeaningful condition. For those participants
in the meaningful condition, the analogical rule was also learned in fewer trials, albeit
this difference was not statistically significant.
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Table 4.
Position Biases During First 500 Trials for Rhesus Monkeys

Subject

Condition

Murph

Meaningful

Left

74

24.79*

Nonmeaningful

Right

88

21.67*

Meaningful

Left

94

40.99*

Nonmeaningful

Right

97

56.89*

Meaningful

Left

92

47.91*

Nonmeaningful

Right

92

27.68*

Meaningful

Left

76

18.54*

Nonmeaningful

Right

81

21.30*

Meaningful

Left

87

36.66*

Nonmeaningful

Right

75

16.96*

Lou

Willie

Gale

Hank

* p <0.01

Side Biased

% Biased

z
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Response times, although significantly shorter after criterion was met, did not illustrate
any effect meaningful stimuli. Differences in response time pre- and post-acquisition may
reflect a practice effect as a result of increased joystick familiarity over time. Whereas
this may be a confound of the measure, a more parsimonious explanation is that
participants spent more time examining stimuli and attempting to determine the rule on
trials before criterion was achieved.
The representational value of each stimulus enabled the relational concepts of
sameness and difference to be more salient to the participants in the meaningful condition
than those who completed the task with (nonmeaningful) stimuli that had no inherent
representational value. The discrete meaningful value of a stimulus not only enhances its
own uniqueness, but may also remove associations it may have to the stimulus with
which it is paired. For instance, the word “apple” always has the same representational
value, but did not always appear paired with the word “carrot” that has its own distinct
meaning. This dual role for meaning may allow for relational information about a pair of
stimuli to emerge as the salient overall stimulus quality in fewer trials than if specific
perceptual dimensions of a stimulus must be closely attended to on each trial.
It is interesting that some people failed to learn the analogical rule under any
condition. On their de-briefing forms, these participants noted that they simply “never
figured it out” or “tried to match similar things, but that didn’t work.” Therefore,
relational similarities and differences never became salient as part of a rule-learning
strategy. Like children, (Gentner, 1988) they may have been distracted by the surface
similarities between the components of one trial. Whereas failure to learn the analogical
rule may have been due to differences in motivation to participate, it is likely that if
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structural similarities (i.e., the matching rule) were disclosed to the participants at the
beginning of the experiment, success would be imminent.
Chimpanzees
One chimpanzee showed above chance performance on the ago relational s/d task,
but only in the meaningful-lexigram condition. A second chimpanzee also performed at
levels above chance, but in the opposite condition (nonmeaningful-lexigram). Individual
differences in performance by the chimpanzees may have arisen for a variety of reasons:
the individual does not have the capacity for analogical reasoning, the representational
value of the lexigram (or numeral) is not strong enough to differentiate it and allow for
the emergence of a relational rule for the individual, or the representational
value of the meaningful stimuli was so strong that the animal did not have the ability to
overcome its inherent value and recognize relational information within a pair of these
meaningful stimuli. In addition, asymmetric effects on same versus different trials may
reflect an inflexibly acquired rule. Asymmetric effects are an indication that half of the
analogical rule is understood, but that the opposite of that rule may not also hold true.
For Lana and Mercury, whose performance did not differ significantly from
chance in any condition, meaning most likely did not function to make the stimuli
discrete entities, but rather the pairing of stimuli functioned only as a set without
independent constituent parts. Because these animals were not able to extract relational
information from the sample pair, completing the analogical problem correctly was
impossible.
Panzee, who successfully completed only trials in the meaningful condition, and
not nonmeaningful or number, seems dependent on the meaningfulness of stimuli in
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order to match the choice relation to the sample. One should note that whereas this
difference between meaningful (lexigrams) and nonmeaningful conditions is significant,
an accuracy of 66% for the meaningful (lexigram) condition is less convincing than a
criterion of 80% or better that is typically regarded as evidence for task acquisition (e.g.,
Blaisdell & Cook, 2005; Cook, Cavoto, & Cavoto, 1995; Wasserman et al., 2002; Young
& Wasserman, 2002). Rather than facilitating the acquisition of the analogical rule, one
chimpanzee failed to acquire the analogical rule at all unless the stimuli have discreet
meaning. Even after completing the meaningful sessions first, Panzee failed to perform
above levels of chance during nonmeaningful and number sessions. This would indicate
that what she learned during the meaningful sessions was not a general overarching
analogical rule as we might conceive it. If that were the case, she should have transferred
her knowledge from the first condition (meaningful) to the next conditions presented.
Rather, it is possible that she viewed the nonmeaningful and numeral conditions as
completely novel tasks that she had to learn. Alternatively, the analogical rule that she
learned may be specific to those stimuli with external representation and thus the rule
could not be applied in instances in which meaningful symbols are not present. However,
by this logic, she should have been able correctly to complete trials with Arabic numerals
present. That she did not perform above levels of chance with these stimuli either may
indicate that Arabic numerals may not represented in as concrete a way that objects such
as foods and places are (i.e., representation as estimates; see Beran, 2004) . Perhaps her
analogical rule applied in a rather limited way only to symbols for specific, exactlydefined objects.
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Sherman responded in a manner opposite to Panzee. He completed trials only in
the nonmeaningful condition above levels of chance. Again, whereas this difference
between meaningful (lexigrams) and nonmeaningful conditions is significant, an
accuracy of 65% in the nonmeaningful condition does not represent a very strong effect.
Rather than assisting his acquisition of an analogical rule, meaning may act as a
confusing factor for Sherman. That he could correctly complete only nonmeaningful
trials may indicate that his analogical rule was more perceptually than symbolically
based. Perhaps he attended more specifically to the perceptual qualities of a stimulus in
order to determine its relatedness to another within the pair. In the meaningful and
number conditions, it may be the case that when a meaningful stimulus was present,
Sherman did not look past the specific meaning associated with it in order to search for
relational information. Rather, Sherman may search only for stimuli that match in their
meaning and not in their relational value. For both Panzee and Sherman, poor
performance on subsequent conditions may be indicative of the inflexibility of their
application of the analogical rule.
Asymmetric performance by Sherman on different trials in comparison to same
trials in the nonmeaningful condition indicates that the analogical rule acquired applied
only to differently related pairs of items. Rather than using the rule to match relations
flexibly across trial types, asymmetric performance indicates that the strategy used was
not fully developed so that a consistent rule could be applied to same relations.
Both pigeons and people are predisposed to notice differences as well as
similarities (Fagot et al., 2001; Young & Wasserman, 2002). Like pigeons and people,
chimpanzees exhibit some differences in performance on same versus different trials. If
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we suppose that chimpanzees are predisposed to noticing only differences, it is likely that
(at least for Sherman) an analogical rule was realized only through experience matching
differently related pairs with other differently related pairs. In subsequent trials, when
similarly related pairs were presenting, the limited analogical rule that he learned no
longer applied.
Monkeys
Failure to match relational pairs correctly in this task could be the result of one or
more of a variety of reasons: the monkeys cannot extract the necessary relational
information from a pair of objects, relational knowledge is not encoded such that it is
accessible for application to novel behaviors, or perceptual properties of stimuli can not
be ignored in a matching paradigm.
From their performance on previous tasks (e.g., Flemming et al., 2005), we know
that monkeys can extract relational information from a pair of objects. In a two-choice
discrimination paradigm, monkeys chose either a pair of identical or nonidentical objects
in the presence of a discriminative cue. It may be the case that the monkey’s ability to
extract relational information is reliant on a discriminative cue; the discriminative cue
prompts the search for relational information present in the given sample. In the current
task, no discriminative cue was offered, perhaps not enabling the search for a relation
between the items in the pair.
Whereas monkeys possess the ability to extract relational information from a pair
of items in certain testing instances, they fail to express this type of knowledge in a
relational match-to-sample (MTS) paradigm. Their history with the MTS paradigm may
be so closely tied the task to the search for perceptual similarities amongst presented
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items that requesting a different rule (the search for relational similarities) is
unreasonable to expect. When pairs of items are presented, and no choice pair includes
similar perceptual qualities, monkeys may be inflexible in their quest for a new rule to
impose on the seemingly familiar task.
Relational matching may not be beyond the capability of rhesus monkeys or some
chimpanzees, but it would seem that relational information is certainly not as salient as it
seems to be for humans. Presenting the task in a slightly modified paradigm could make
more salient the relational information to be utilized in the task. One plausible variation
could present each stimulus individually and successively, forcing attention first to the
uniqueness of each item composing the pair, followed by combined attention to the pair
itself. In addition, removal of the sample pair before choice pair presentation can reduce
visual complexity on the screen. If the sample pair is removed from the screen, the search
for a perceptually identical match can be diminished. In this new task variation, attention
to the pairs as a grouping of two objects rather than a conglomerate, and a diversion from
perceptual matching are achieved.

General Discussion
Robust differences in performance emerged across species in this analogical
reasoning task. Not only did human participants outperform chimpanzees and monkeys,
but the role of meaning when completing an analogy was also dissimilar across species.
According to these data, stimuli with representational value can facilitate, hinder, or have
no effect on the completion of an analogy of same and different objects.
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Taken together, the results of this comparative study both lend support and
opposition to the previous suggestion that language-like abilities and symbolic training
are integral to the capacity of analogical reasoning. As was discussed above, Premack
(1983) concluded that language-like training is necessary based on his experiments with
Sarah, a chimpanzee. Similarly, Thompson et al. (1997) posited that labeling of relational
information is a necessary component of analogical thinking. Whereas the results of the
current study do not allow for the conclusion that human and chimpanzee participants
were labeling the related pairs of stimuli, individual differences which arose between the
chimpanzees urge the consideration of an alternate hypothesis. With extensive lexical
vocabularies, three of the four chimpanzees that participated in this study have the
capacity to label items, and by Thompson and colleagues’ (1997) logic should possess the
ability to conceptualize relations-between-relations. One chimpanzee was not able to do
so in any of three conditions (meaningful, nonmeaningful, and number). One chimpanzee
was able to complete the task only when individual stimuli afforded external
representation (meaningful); still another chimpanzee successfully completed the task
only when stimuli were unfamiliar and nonmeaningful. These differences in performance
suggest one of three alternate hypotheses related to labeling: labeling of relations is
dependent upon different stimulus qualities for different individuals, labels must exist for
specific same and different terms, or labeling plays no role in analogical reasoning.
Whereas one chimpanzee has a lexical vocabulary and can certainly label external
objects with corresponding lexigrams, above chance performance on the analogical
reasoning task would be expected, but was not observed. This poor performance may
mean that labeling, if in fact occurring during the task, plays no role in the acquisition of
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an analogical rule. Another possibility, though, is that labeling of relational information is
not made more salient than the overt object labels (of individual stimuli) themselves. That
is, meaning of individual stimuli confounds the labeling of the related pair for this
individual. This could also be the case for the chimpanzee that correctly completed trials
in the nonmeaningful condition, but not in meaningful or number. Perhaps after correctly
completing trials in the nonmeaningful condition (either with or without succinct labels
or re-coding terms of relatedness), this individual had used labels that were specific to
physical similarities between stimuli to recode the pair. In the meaningful condition,
identity pairs are physical matches in addition to their matched meaning. Perhaps when
representational value for specific external objects is present, that meaning becomes the
default dimension of salience, rather than allowing for the search of abstract labels that
are not overtly present, but must be created by attending only to the relatedness of
stimuli.
The numeral condition carried out with the chimpanzees deserves special
consideration. Numerical studies with the chimpanzees (e.g. Beran, 2004) suggest that
Arabic numerals, like lexigrams, carry with them some type of representational value.
How these numerals are represented is yet undetermined. Rather than concrete quantity
information, it is likely that these Arabic numerals represent a vague estimate of a
number of items (Beran, 2004). For this reason, although they are meaningful, they
should not be placed on a level of representational capacity equal to lexigrams.
Lexigrams are symbols that are used on a daily basis to reference specific people, places,
objects, and foods. Numerals, however, are used only in a small percentage of cognitive
tasks, and are not spontaneously used by the chimpanzees to reference, for example,
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“how many” of an item they would like to obtain. Therefore, their concept of number,
aside from the little experimenters know about it, is surely less broad than the knowledge
the chimpanzees have of the concrete objects they commonly reference with lexigrams.
What Analogies Mean for the S/D Concept
The relational matching paradigm utilized throughout this study tests analogical
reasoning skills by forcing explicit expression of conceptual knowledge for same and
differently related pairs. Thus, analogy completion assumes (and relies on) conceptual
knowledge of same and different. Certainly, human participants in this study have a very
broad conception of same and different, as humans regularly classify objects into groups
based on similarities and differences. Perhaps our propensity to do so is driven by the
salience of relations. Whereas it is clear that other animals have the capacity to perceive
the relations of same and different (Bovet & Vauclair, 2001; Cook et al., 1995; Flemming
et al. 2005; Katz et al., 2002; Wasserman et al., 2002), the acquisition of these concepts
for birds and monkeys does not emerge for sometimes hundreds of trials. Human
participants as young as 3 years old have provided evidence that the identity/nonidentity
concept emerges in significantly fewer trials (Gentner & Markman, 1997).
Because the concepts of same and different are not as salient to nonhuman
primates as they are to humans, their use when searching for an already abstract matching
rule (in RMTS) is not as readily available a strategy. Pigeons and monkeys which have
been shown in some studies to rely on arrays of multiple items in order to glean relational
information (e.g., Wasserman et al., 2002) may rely on more ecological valid strategies
(i.e., colors and shapes) when presented with a matching to sample task. Unlike simple
discriminations that rely only on implicit types of conceptual knowledge, the analogical
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paradigm carried throughout this study requires the explicit use of the same/different
strategy. In sum, because the same/different concept is less salient and possibly more
narrowly conceived for nonhuman primates, it stands to reason that the application of the
concept would be more difficult for such an animal.
Species Differences: Why Analogies Are Difficult Even for Us
Application of analogical reasoning sometimes can occur spontaneously for
humans, rather than explicitly being told to use an analogy in order to solve a problem
(Dunbar, 2001). In most scenarios, like standardized tests, we are instructed explicitly to
think of the problem in terms of relationships and that analogical reasoning should be
applied. This type of instruction is impossible to deliver to a nonhuman primate. That the
chimpanzees in this study complete the problem at all (without explicit instruction) is
impressive.
When the similarities between old and new problems are surface, (e.g., using the
same elements) analogical reasoning is more quickly applied to the new problem. Rather,
if the similarities between previous experiences and novel problems are only structural
(e.g. content) in nature, application of analogical reasoning skills is far less obvious and
therefore not as salient a strategy.
In experiments with children and adult humans, researchers agree that surface
similarities are the key to whether participants will think of using an analogy to solve a
problem when not explicitly told to do so (Catrambone, 2002; Gentner, Rattermann, &
Forbes, 1993). In addition, human participants are particularly distracted by surface
similarities in analogous problems, even when they are unimportant (Ross, 1987).
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In the current study, only structural similarities exist across trials. Surface
similarities in the current paradigm would only exist if individual stimuli were
consistently arranged across trials. The repeated presentation of individual stimuli (albeit
in various locations and combinations of pairings) could be interpreted as surface
similarities which act as confounds not related to the application of analogical
knowledge. If stimulus A is present in the sample pair, not only may the subject attempt
to search for stimulus A amongst the choice pairs, but they may also retain knowledge of
the role of stimulus A for future trials. Thus, if stimulus A is encountered again,
regardless of current location or pairing, rules previously associated with it may be
incorrectly applied to the current scenario.
Children as old as 11 years old often have difficulties in their analogical reasoning
abilities. Rather than responding on the basis of relational similarities, thematic- and
object-similarity choices are often are more salient to children (Rattermann & Gentner,
1998). Later in development, most children successfully solve analogical reasoning
noting relational similarities and differences. For this reason, there is likely a shift
whereby children interpret analogy only in terms of object similarity and then in terms of
relational similarity (Gentner, 1988; Ratterman & Gentner, 1998).
In sum, the present study uncovers both common threads and disparities in the
analogical reasoning skills of members of the primate lineage. Whereas meaningful
stimuli act as facilitators for humans in making more salient the relational information
presented and consequently the nature of an analogical rule, meaning can take on various
roles for other primate species. Representational value can take on the role of both
enabling and inhibiting analogy completion for chimpanzees, and seems to have no
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facillatory role at all for rhesus monkeys. These different roles may reflect the different
ways that nonhuman primates represent their worlds. Despite the ambiguity of the exact
mechanism by which analogies are realized, the present experiment provides the first
parallel comparison of the acquisition of an analogical rule across three species of
primates.
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